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OCEAN PLANNING AND THE GULF OF MAINE:
EXPLORING BI-NATIONAL POLICY OPTIONS
Lucia Fanning*
Rita Heimes**

I. INTRODUCTION
Over the twenty-five years since a special Chamber of the
International Court of Justice (ICJ) issued its decision in the Delimitation
of the Maritime Boundary in the Gulf of Maine Area (Gulf of Maine
Case),1 legal scholars have written extensively on the significance of the
ruling to influence Canada-U.S. relations specifically, and international
arbitration in general.2 While the rationale behind any particular
scholar’s interest in the case has varied over the years, its significance in
informing deliberation surrounding maritime boundary delimitation owes
much to the fact that the case presented many “firsts.” Among these
were: the use of a special Chamber of the Court;3 the decision by Canada
to submit the dispute to an international tribunal on its own behalf;4 and
the request that a decision be made on a “single maritime boundary” that
would include, not only the seabed beyond the limits of the territorial
* Associate Professor, School for Resource and Environmental Studies, and
Director of the Marine Affairs Program, Faculty of Management, Dalhousie University.
** Research Professor and Director of the Center for Law & Innovation, University
of Maine School of Law.
1. Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary in the Gulf of Maine Area (Can. v. U.S.)
1984 I.C.J. 246 (Oct. 12) [hereinafter Gulf of Maine Case].
2. See generally L.H. Legault & D.M. McRae, The Gulf of Maine Case, 22 CAN.
Y.B. INT’L L. 267 (1984) (providing examples of a comprehensive analysis of the
decision and its implications); Edward Collins & Martin Rogoff, The Gulf of Maine Case
and the Future of Ocean Boundary Delimitation, 38 ME. L. REV. 1 (1986); Davis
Robinson, David Colson & Bruce Rashkow, Some Perspectives on Adjudicating Before
the World Court: The Gulf of Maine Case, 79 AM. J. INT’L L. 578 (1985).
3. See R. Brauer, International Conflict Resolution: The ICJ Chamber and the Gulf
of Maine Dispute, 23 VA. J. INT’L L. 463 (1982-1983).
4. See Erik Wang, Adjudication of Canada-United States Disputes, 19 CAN. Y.B.
INT’L L. 158 (1983).
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sea, but also the water column.5 In addition to its uniqueness, the
significance of this request for a single boundary to delineate both seabed
and fisheries resources has led many scholars, and even one of the judges
of the Chamber, to question the legality and appropriateness of the
request.6
As only the third case of maritime boundary delimitation to be heard
by the Court at the time, the Gulf of Maine Case highlighted the
Chamber’s novel use of a hierarchy of principles, equitable criteria, and
practical methods in reaching its decision.7 At the same time, it has been
subject to much criticism.8 Commentators have noted that the challenge
of maritime boundary delimitation is to “reconcile conflicting claims to a
maritime extension of coasts that differ in configuration, length and
position in relation to the area to be delimited.”9 While solutions to this
problem have been attempted in decisions rendered by the Chamber10
and the full Court11 over its sixty-five year history,12 assessing these
judgments for guidance on maritime boundary delimitation is not the aim
of this Article. Rather, its purpose is to focus on the issues confronting
Canada and the United States after the Gulf of Maine decision was

5. SPECIAL AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES AND THE
GOVERNMENT OF CANADA TO SUBMIT TO A CHAMBER OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF
JUSTICE THE DELIMITATION OF THE MARITIME BOUNDARY OF THE GULF OF MAINE AREA,
Article 2 (2), available at http://www.un.org/Depts/los/LEGISLATIONANDTREATIES
/PDFFILES/TREATIES/CAN-USA1979MB.PDF.
6. Judge Gros, one of the five judges of the Chamber, questioned how the parties
could relieve themselves from the obligation of Article 6 of the 1958 United Nation
Convention on the Continental Shelf simply by asking the Court to rule on a single
boundary for both the seabed and the water column. He contended that since Article 6
called for the principle of equidistance to be applied in delimiting the seabed, in theory,
two boundaries, one for the seabed and one for the water column, could be a likely
outcome. The Chamber concluded that Article 6 was not applicable to the delimitation of
a single maritime boundary. Gulf of Maine Case, 1984 I.C.J. at 365 (Gros, J., dissenting).
7. See Legault & McRae, supra note 2 at 289.
8. See Ted McDorman, Phillip Saunders & David VanderZwaag, The Gulf of Maine
Boundary: Dropping Anchor or Setting a Course, 9 MARINE POLICY, 90 (1985); L. Clain,
Gulf of Maine: A Disappointing First in the Delimitation of a Single Maritime Boundary,
25 VA J. INT’L L. 521 (1985); David Colson, The Delimitation of the Outer Continental
Shelf between Neighboring States, 97 AM. J. INT’L L. 91 (2003).
9. See Legault & McRae, supra note 2 at 289.
10. See e.g., Gulf of Maine Case,1984 I.C.J. 246.
11. See e.g., Continental Shelf (Tunis. v. Libyan Arab Jamahiriya), 1982 I.C.J. 18
(Feb. 24); North Sea Continental Shelf (F.R.G. v. Den.), 1969 I.C.J. 3 (Feb. 20).
12. The International Court of Justice is the principal judicial organ of the United
Nations. It was established in June 1945 by the Charter of the United Nations and began
work in April 1946.
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rendered and to explore how these two “friendly” neighboring states
have attempted to pursue the principles of cooperation and agreement
following the decision of the Court.13
As such, this Article is structured around five key components and is
aimed at: (1) highlighting the underlying economic rationale behind why
the two neighboring countries of Canada and the United States sought to
clarify a single maritime boundary in the Gulf of Maine; (2) identifying
the challenges confronting the parties in managing their ocean resources,
after ownership had been established, particularly in light of growing
energy-related exploitation demands; (3) discussing mechanisms for
ocean planning and management adopted by each party to utilize its
living and non-living resources; (4) presenting two examples of existing
bilateral cooperation from which lessons can be gleaned for future
collaborative efforts; and (5) identifying policy options and an
implementation mechanism for transboundary cooperation in the Gulf of
Maine that could potentially meet the objectives of both countries as they
seek to implement marine spatial planning in their respective maritime
zones.
II. THE ECONOMIC RATIONALE FOR PURSUING A BOUNDARY
DELIMITATION DECISION IN THE GULF OF MAINE
While evidence exists of sentiments of national pride and national
honor being aroused by threats to territory14 and some scholars have
pointed to the psychological importance of territory that exceeds its
intrinsic value,15 it is clear that the exponential expansion of ocean
territory by coastal states has arisen primarily over securing access to
offshore resources.
Key among these are fisheries resources,
hydrocarbon deposits, and, more recently, the production of renewable
forms of energy using wind, tides, and currents.
Canada and the United States have disputed each other’s maritime
boundary claims in all three of their shared ocean spaces.16 To date, the
13. In the Gulf of Maine Case, the Chamber referred to the historical friendliness and
cooperation between Canada and the United States and expressed confidence that the
“parties will surely be able to surmount any difficulties and take the right steps to ensure
the positive development of their activities . . . .” Gulf of Maine Case, 1984 I.C.J. at 344.
14. See A.O. CUKWURAH, THE SETTLEMENT OF BOUNDARY DISPUTES IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW (1967).
15. See e.g., EVAN LUARD, THE INTERNATIONAL REGULATION OF FRONTIER DISPUTES
(1970).
16. These include the disputed triangle in the Beaufort Sea in the Arctic, Juan de Fuca
Strait between Washington State and Vancouver Island, Dixon Entrance, south of the
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parties have sought clarification from an available international dispute
resolution mechanism, such as the International Court of Justice, only in
the Gulf of Maine disputed area17 and the evidence strongly suggests that
that the driver behind this decision was economic in nature.18 While the
parties called for a single maritime boundary to be drawn from the coast
two hundred miles seaward, within the 90,000 square kilometer Gulf of
Maine, the focus of the dispute was identified as Georges Bank, over
which ownership of some forty-two percent of the Bank was in dispute.19
Georges Bank is a broad, shallow, detached marine area of
approximately 45,000 square kilometers (300 km x 150 km) located on
the continental shelf seaward of the Gulf of Maine but within the
delimitation area, off the coasts of Massachusetts and Southwestern
Nova Scotia. Water depths are less than 100 meters over most of the
Bank. The area has been studied by Canadian and American researchers
for more than 100 years and the existing scientific knowledge has been
well documented and summarized.20
On October 12, 1984, the ICJ ruled on the single maritime boundary
dispute between Canada and the United States, granting Canada the
water column and seabed of approximately twenty-five percent of the
Alaskan panhandle and north of Canada’s Queen Charlotte Islands in the Pacific, and the
area near Machias Seal Island, as well as the disputed area in the Gulf of Maine (settled
by the ICJ in 1984).
17. As noted by Jonathan Charney, third party international dispute settlement has
increased dramatically with the development of the dispute settlement system in the 1982
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea and its coming into force in November
1994. The Convention encourages parties to settle their disputes by means of their
mutual choice, including negotiations and voluntary conciliation. The forums available
include the Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, the International Court of Justice, arbitration,
and special arbitration (for disputes involving fisheries, the marine environment, marine
scientific research and navigation). See Jonathan Charney, The Implications of
Expanding Dispute Settlement Systems: The 1982 Convention on the Law of the Sea, 90
AM. J. INT’L L. 69 (1996).
18. See generally Collins & Rogoff, supra note 2, at 2-7 (providing a summary of the
economic importance of the area to both Canada and the United States); the Memorial of
Canada (Can v. US), 1982 I.C.J. Pleadings 1 (Sept. 27, 1982) [hereinafter Canadian
Memorial]; Annexes to the Memorial of Canada (Can v. US), 1982 I.C.J. Pleadings 1
(Sept. 27, 1982); the Memorial of the United States (Can. v US), 1982 I.C.J. Pleadings 1
(Sept. 27, 1982) [hereinafter United States Memorial]; DAVID VANDERZWAAG, THE FISH
FEUD: THE US AND CANADIAN BOUNDARY DISPUTE (1983).
19. Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary in the Gulf of Maine Area (Can. v. U.S.)
1984 I.C.J. 246, 272 (Oct. 12).
20. See RICHARD BACKUS, GEORGES BANK (Donald Bourne ed., 1987); P.R. Boudreau
et al., The Possible Environmental Impacts of Petroleum Exploration Activities on the
Georges Bank Ecosystem, 2259 CAN. TECH. REP. FISH. AQUAT. SCI. (1999).
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Gulf of Maine and more importantly, an area of approximately 7000
square kilometers on Georges Bank. The decision to refer the dispute to
the ICJ for a final and binding decision followed questions of ownership
over both fishing and hydrocarbon resources. In the case of the fishery
resources, overlapping areas became evident21 when each of the two
nations responded to extensive foreign fishing pressures by claiming in
legislation 200 nautical mile (nm) exclusive fishing zones (EFZ) in the
mid-to-late 1970s.22 Disagreement over the seabed arose following the
claiming of exclusive jurisdiction over the non-living resources of the
continental shelf in 194523 and the subsequent granting of hydrocarbon
permits by Canada in 1964.24
The Canadian government leased the first parcel of land on Georges
Bank to Texaco Canada Inc. in 1964. By 1986, Chevron, BP-Amoco and
Texaco held large exploration permits covering the East Georges Bank
Basin. These permits covered the entire Canadian portion of the Bank
and in the case of BP-Amoco leases, extended off the Bank into deeper
waters. In 1986, efforts by Texaco, aimed at soliciting public support for
exploratory activities, coincided with the call for a provincial election.
This resulted in political pressure being applied by the fishing
constituency in the Southwestern portion of the province.25 The power of
the fishing constituency led to a political decision by the federal and
provincial governments imposing a thirteen-year moratorium on
petroleum activity on the Canadian portion of Georges Bank.26
21. See Glen Herbert, Fishery Relations in the Gulf of Maine: Implications of an
Arbitrated Maritime Boundary 19 MAR. POL. 301 (1995).
22. See Fishery Conservation and Management Act, Pub. L. No. 94-265, 90 Stat. 331
(1976) (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1882 (2007)); Territorial Sea and
Fishing Zones Act, Fishing Zones of Canada (Zones 4 and 5) Order, C.R.C. 1548, P.C.
1977-1, (1977).
23. Pres. Proc. No. 2667, Policy of the United States with Respect to the Natural
Resources of the Subsoil and Seabed of the Continental Shelf, 3 C.F.R. § 39 (1945 Supp.)
[hereinafter the Truman Declaration].
24. See generally Canadian Memorial, supra note 18, at 92-99 (discussing the claims
by the two countries and the failure to reach agreement bilaterally); United States
Memorial, supra note 18, at 81-86 (discussing the same).
25. An appreciation for the publicity and tension surrounding the 1987 debate to allow
oil and gas exploration on Georges Bank can be gleaned from the following samples of
headlines from newspaper articles at the time: Risking the priceless fishery of Georges
Bank to bring up more oil, GLOBE AND MAIL, January 17, 1987; Opening Georges Bank
to firms would lure Americans, DAILY COMMERCIAL NEWS, November 11, 1987;
Battlelines clearly drawn on Georges Bank dispute, ATLANTIC INSIGHT, January 1988.
26. The prohibition was legislatively mandated in the 1987 Canada-Nova Scotia
Petroleum Resources Accord Implementation (Nova Scotia) Act and its federal
counterpart, the 1988 Canada-Nova Scotia Petroleum Resources Accord Implementation
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Following the conclusion of a Public Panel Review in 1999,27 the
moratorium was subsequently extended to December 2012.28 This
decision resulted in both the U.S. and Canadian portions of Georges
Bank being subject to a ban on petroleum-related activities.
In the United States, ten exploratory wells were drilled on the
undisputed U.S. portion of Georges Bank between 1976 and 1982. This
activity was associated with the only successful lease offering by the
United States for the Georges Bank area.29 None of the wells
encountered significant concentrations of petroleum resources. Starting
in 1982, the U.S. Congress enacted a series of one-year leasing moratoria
on portions of the Outer Continental Shelf. This eventually led to an
executive order by President William J. Clinton in 1998, preventing any
leases from being offered for a period of fourteen years, in areas that
were currently under moratorium. While there are no outstanding leases
on the U.S. portion of the Bank, the three leaseholders on the Canadian
portion of the Bank continue to hold exclusive exploration rights.
However, these are suspended while the moratorium remains in effect.30
Act. See Canada-Nova Scotia Petroleum Resources Accord Implementation (Nova
Scotia) Act, S.N.S. 1987, c. 3 (1987); Canada-Nova Scotia Petroleum Resources Accord
Implementation Act, S.C. 1988, c. 28 (1988).
27. Reflecting the growing recognition of public involvement in decision-making, the
legislation also called for a public review to be established prior to the termination date of
the moratorium. The review panel was authorized to examine the environmental and
socio-economic impacts associated with exploration and drilling on Georges Bank and to
make its recommendation to the responsible federal and provincial Ministers by July 1,
1999. The Ministers were charged with making a decision, prior to January 1, 2000, on
whether the moratorium would be extended. In keeping with the legislative requirements
in both the federal and provincial Accord Acts, a review process was conducted to
examine the issues associated with oil and gas exploration on Georges Bank. Following
the review process, the three-member panel recommended the extension of the
moratorium. MULLALLY ET AL., GEORGES BANK REVIEW PANEL REPORT (1999), available
at http://www.cnsopb.ns.ca/pdfs/ georgesbankreport.pdf.
28. See Government of Nova Scotia, Petroleum Directorate, Georges Bank
Moratorium
Extended,
Dec.
22,
1999,
http://www.gov.ns.ca/news/
details.asp?id=19991222004.
29. Federal Offshore Lease Sale 42 was held on December 18, 1979. It resulted in the
leasing of sixty-three blocks to companies. The total value of the leases was
$816,516,546. Estimates of the hydrocarbon resources for this sale did not include the
disputed area, and were given by the U.S. Department of the Interior as 123 million
barrels of oil and 870 billion cubic feet of natural gas. GARY EDSON ET AL., U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF INTERIOR, GEORGES BANK PETROLEUM EXPLORATION: ATLANTIC OUTER
CONTINENTAL SHELF (2000), available at http://www.gomr.mms.gov/PDFs/2000/2000031.pdf.
30. See Lucia Fanning, Understanding Influence: Lessons from Canada’s and Nova
Scotia’s 1999 Georges Bank Moratorium Decision, 23 OCEAN Y.B. 119 (2009)
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Technological advances at the time of, and subsequent to, the 1945
Truman Declaration31 clearly presented opportunities to exploit the
hydrocarbon resources believed to be present on Georges Bank.
However, the lack of drilling success, coupled with the political strength
of the fishing sector in both Canada and the United States, significantly
reduced the economic role of the petroleum sector as a key driver behind
boundary delimitation at the time. Rather, the evidence more likely
supports the role of Georges Bank as an important and traditional fishing
ground for Canadian and U.S. fishers, due to its uniquely high biological
productivity, as the principal economic driver behind the pursuit for a
binding decision by the ICJ.
Georges Bank has been reported to sustain levels of fish productivity
two to three times greater than comparable continental shelf areas, such
as the Gulf of Maine, Scotian Shelf, and North Sea.32 However, as with
the conflicting claims over the ownership of the seabed, the two
countries also claimed 200 nautical mile EFZs in 1977, which resulted in
overlapping boundaries.
In 1978, both countries suspended the
implementation of a 1977 Interim Fishing Agreement that allowed
fishers from both countries access to areas in which they had
traditionally fished, regardless of the newly-established EFZ
boundaries.33 In an attempt to resolve the disputes, a treaty34 was signed
by both countries in 1979 to submit the delimitation of the maritime
boundary and an Agreement on East Coast Fishery Resources35 to
binding dispute settlement. The linking of the two issues required them
both to be ratified by each country for either to come into force.
However, the linkage was subsequently severed in 1981, due to massive
opposition from the U.S. fishing industry in New England over the terms
of the agreement.36 Canada agreed to proceed with the boundary dispute
(providing a comprehensive examination of the factors influencing the decision to extend
the petroleum moratorium on Canadian side of Georges Bank).
31. Truman Declaration, supra note 23.
32. See BACKUS, supra note 20; Boudreau et al., supra note 20. See also E.B. Cohen
& M.D. Grosslein, Production on Georges Bank Compared With Other Shelf Ecosystem,
in RICHARD BACKUS, GEORGES BANK 382 (Donald Bourne ed., 1987); Gardner Pinfold
Consulting Economists Ltd., Georges Bank Resources: An Economic Profile (1998).
33. Canada-USA, Reciprocal Fisheries Agreement between the Government of
Canada and the Government of the United States of America (Feb. 24, 1977).
34. Treaty to Submit to Binding Dispute Settlement the Delimitation of the Maritime
Boundary in the Gulf of Maine Area,U.S.-Can., Mar. 10, 1979, T.I.A.S. No. 10204.
35. Agreement between the Government of Canada and the Government of the United
States of America on East Coast Fishery Resources, S. Exec. Doc. V, 96th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1979).
36. Herbert, supra note 21, at 308.
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settlement treaty37 without the Fishery Agreement, and Memorials38 from
both countries were submitted to the ICJ in 1982, along with the Special
Agreement by the parties to submit the boundary question to a Chamber
of the ICJ, rather than the full Court.39
With the establishment of the ICJ boundary, known as ‘the Hague
line’ in 1984, the jurisdictional issue between the two countries was
resolved, with Canada receiving approximately one-sixth of the total area
of Georges Bank, including the rich scallop and fishing areas known as
the Northeast Peak and the Northern edge.40 However, as has been noted
by scholars since and experienced by resource managers for the two
countries, the problem of managing Georges Bank’s transboundary
fishery resources remained.41 Furthermore, since the ICJ decision in
1984, approaches recommended for managing coastal and marine
resources have evolved from a single sector focus to integrated
management across sectors, incorporating sustainable development
principles of ecosystem-based management, the precautionary approach,
and public participation. Part III of this Article highlights some of the
challenges confronting the parties in managing a mature sector such as
fisheries and a newly emerging sector such as renewable energies within
the Gulf of Maine.
III. POST-HAGUE LINE DECISION CHALLENGES FOR OCEAN RESOURCE
UTILIZATION IN THE GULF OF MAINE
While the 1984 ICJ “Hague Line” decision resolved the question
presented to the Court regarding the establishment of a single maritime
boundary in the Gulf of Maine, many of the practical issues surrounding
the management of shared resources remained. Despite the expectation
by the Court that the two parties would work collaboratively to resolve
these issues,42 numerous incidents of U.S. vessels illegally fishing in
Canadian waters were recorded.43 Given the importance of resource
37. The Treaty came into force on November 20, 1981. See Collins & Rogoff, supra
note 2, at 5.
38. See Canadian Memorial and United States Memorial, supra note 18.
39. See SPECIAL AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA, supra note
5.
40. Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary in the Gulf of Maine Area (Can. v. U.S.)
1984 I.C.J. 246 (Oct. 12).
41. See e.g., Emily Pudden & David VanderZwaag, Canada-USA Bilateral Fisheries
Management in the Gulf of Maine: Under the Radar Screen, 16 RECIEL 36 (2007).
42. Gulf of Maine Case, 1984 I.C.J. at 344.
43. See Herbert, supra note 21.
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allocation, and specifically fisheries resources, as a key driver behind the
pursuit of a binding settlement, it is appropriate to briefly describe the
challenges and efforts undertaken to overcome them in the years
following the decision. Additionally, this section will highlight some of
the challenging issues that could arise from emerging ocean uses such as
renewable energy exploitation and the efforts by both countries to seize
existing opportunities within the Gulf of Maine.44
A. The Fisheries
As described by Emily Pudden and Professor David VanderZwaag,
fisheries management continued to be handled in a unilateral manner by
Canada and the United States in the years immediately following the ICJ
decision.45 This persisted as the norm until 1995, when the continuing
collapse of groundfish stocks on both sides of the line resulted in the
establishment of the Canada-U.S. Steering Committee. This nonlegislative, bilateral, advisory body is co-chaired by the Canadian
Department of Fisheries and Oceans (DFO) Regional Director General
(Maritimes Region) and the United States Northeast Regional
Administrator, National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS). In an effort
to manage the three transboundary groundfish stocks of Georges Bank—
cod, haddock, and yellow flounder—the Committee has the mandate of
conducting joint stock assessments and recommending a sharing
agreement for the total allowable catch (TAC) for these stocks. Since its
formation, and following the success of the first joint stock assessment
for cod, haddock, and yellowtail flounder conducted in 1997, a number
of institutional arrangements have evolved under the auspices of the
Steering Committee. Today, the work of the Committee is undertaken
by the species-specific46 Transboundary Resources Assessment

44. Since both countries implemented unilateral moratoria regarding offshore oil and
gas exploitation in the Outer Continental Shelf at the time of the ICJ decision or soon
thereafter, this Article will not discuss the petroleum sector efforts undertaken within
each country. While no hydrocarbon exploitation has occurred on either side of the
Hague Line to date, there is no longer a moratorium on the U.S. side as President Obama
lifted the Executive Withdrawal on Offshore Lands on July 14, 2008, and, on October 1,
2008, the Congressional moratorium was allowed to expire. For a discussion on the
Canadian decision to place a moratorium on oil and gas exploration on Georges Bank to
December 2012, see Fanning, supra note 30.
45. Pudden & VanderZwaag supra note 41, at 36.
46. In addition to the three transboundary species of cod, haddock, and yellowtail
flounder, joint assessment for herring, mackerel, halibut, dogfish, and pollock have either
been agreed to or are being considered by the bilateral Steering Committee. See id. at 37.
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Committee (TRACs) which provides technical advice to the
Transboundary Management Guidance Committee (TMGC).
The
TMGC, in turn, provides advice on the status of the stocks and a
proposed sharing of the TACs to the Canada-U.S. Integration Committee
whose mandate is to ensure the integration of policies and consistency in
approach across the TMGC and other working groups of the Steering
Committee, including the Oceans, Habitat, and Species at Risk working
groups.
Agreement on the sharing formula by the two countries required
some degree of compromise as the United States placed more weight on
historical landings while Canada favored distribution of the resource.
Consensus was reached on the sharing formula that provided for a sevenyear transitional schedule, with allocation percentages that take into
account both contemporary resource distribution and historical utilization
patterns.47 The implementation of the recommended allocation in each
country occurs through the inclusion of the TAC in the respective
fisheries management plans, issued under the authority of the DFO (for
Canada) and the New England Fisheries Management Council (NEFMC)
(for the United States). The TMGC submits its recommendations to the
NEFMC, while in Canada, it liaises with the Gulf of Maine Advisory
Council (GOMAC), comprised of federal and provincial government
representatives, as well as the fishing industry and the Canadian Consul
in Boston, who makes the recommendation to the Minister of Fisheries
and Oceans. However, it is important to note that the responsible
agencies are not required to implement the recommendations of the
Canada-U.S. Bilateral Steering Committee and may opt to increase,
decrease, or maintain the status quo levels for each of the transboundary
species in their respective fisheries management plans.48
47. Id. at 38.
48. The Northeast (NE) Multispecies Fishery Management Plan (FMP) specifies a
procedure for setting annual hard TAC levels for the U.S./Canada Management Area for
GB cod (Gadus morhua), GB haddock (Melanogrammus aeglefinus), and GB yellowtail
flounder (Limanda ferruginea). This action is needed to ensure that the stocks of GB
cod, haddock, and yellowtail flounder that are shared between the United States and
Canada, are managed as required by the FMP and as outlined in the U.S./Canada
Resource Sharing Understanding (Understanding). The Understanding specifies an
allocation of TAC for these three stocks for each country, based on a formula that
considers historical catch percentages and current resource distribution. The purpose of
this action is to implement TACs for these three stocks that will be consistent with the
Understanding and the FMP. For an understanding of the process to implement the
recommendations on the U.S. side of the Hague Line in 2008, see Northeast Multispecies
Fishery Management Plan, Specification of FY 2008 Total Allowable Catches for Eastern
Georges Bank (GB) Cod, Eastern GB Haddock, and GB Yellowtail Flounder in the
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Apart from agreement on the management and sharing of allocation
of the transboundary resources, another significant challenge confronting
the two countries as a result of the establishment of the Hague Line was
the issue of illegal fishing, particularly on the Canadian side. Noncompliance with the boundary line rose to a peak in 1989, spurred by the
discrepancy in the penalties for illegal fishing.49 In the United States, the
maximum fine under the Lacey Act50 was $10,000, while in Canada, the
penalties included a fine of $100,000, confiscation of the catch, seizure
of the vessel, and possible imprisonment.51 To address this problem, the
“Agreement between the Government of the United States and Canada
on Fisheries Enforcement” was negotiated between the two countries in
1990,52 making it illegal for nationals of one nation to not respect the
laws and regulations of the other nation if operating within the
jurisdiction of that nation. The Agreement, which included consistency
with the stricter Canadian penalties, was implemented through each
country’s national legislation,53 and included regular cooperation, sharing
of monitoring, control, and surveillance information, and joint patrolling
along the Hague Line. 54 The outcome of the Agreement has been
positive, with the number of violations decreasing substantial since its
introduction.55 Additionally, due to a shared commitment to rebuild the
stocks in the Gulf of Maine, management efforts have facilitated a
U.S./Canada Management Area--Final Environmental Assessment--Regulatory Impact
Review Final Regulatory Flexibility Analysis. NMFS (February 2008).
49. See Herbert, supra note 21.
50. Lacey Act Amendments of 1981, 16 U.S.C. §§ 3371–3378 (1982).
51. Pudden & VanderZwaag, supra note 41, at 40.
52. AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND
THE GOVERNMENT OF CANADA ON FISHERIES ENFORCEMENT OF SEPTEMBER 26, 1990, H.R.
Doc. No. 102-22 (1st Sess. 1990).
53. The United States has implemented the agreement by issuing the International
Fisheries Regulations, U.S.-Canada Fisheries Enforcement, 50 C.F.R. §§ 300.140–
300.144 (1996); Canada implemented the agreement with the United States Waters
Fisheries Regulations, SOR/91-660, revoked and subsumed by United States Waters
Fisheries Regulations, revocation Fishery (General) Regulations, amendment, SOR/94296.
54. DFO and NOAA are committed to working closely together to coordinate and
ensure the effective delivery of fishery law enforcement programs along the international
boundaries. Representatives from both agencies expressed the need to continue sharing
information in order to improve the effectiveness of enforcement programs. MELANIE
KING, NATIONAL OCEANIC AND ATMOSPHERIC ADMINISTRATION, OFFICE OF
INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS CONCERNING LIVING MARINE
RESOURCES OF INTEREST TO NOAA FISHERIES, 118 (2009), available at
http://www.nmfs.noaa.gov/ia/docs/2009_ lnternational_agreements.pdf.
55. Herbert, supra note 21, at 315.
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reduced number of vessels operating in areas close to the boundary line
due to closures on the U.S. side to scallop fishers. Even with a limited
re-opening, there have been no reports of illegal fishing in the area.56
In assessing the challenges and actions arising from the
establishment of the Hague Line with regard to fisheries resources, it is
tempting to conclude that the collaborative, voluntary, and mandatory
practices implemented by Canada and the United States were exactly
those which the Chamber had in mind when it voiced its hope for
cooperation and agreement by the two parties.57 To that end, it would
appear that there are valuable lessons other states can learn from the
behavior of Canada and the United States, notwithstanding the call for a
greater commitment by the two countries to an integrated transboundary
ecosystem management approach in the Gulf of Maine.58
B. Offshore Renewable Energy
While the issues surrounding transboundary fisheries have a long and
well-established history in the Gulf of Maine that is familiar to both
Canada and the United States, offshore renewable energy is a new and
emerging activity for both countries. The attention given to renewable
energy generation globally and in Canada and the United States is driven
in large measure by three areas of concern, namely the growing
recognition of the impacts of climate change on the earth’s systems, the
rising costs of energy derived from conventional non-renewable sources,
and the need for both countries to ensure energy security.59 While there
is considerable debate over the sources of global warming, concern over
its impacts has been increasing among policy makers, scientists, and the
general public on a global scale.60 However, according to the
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change Fourth Assessment

56. Pudden & VanderZwaag, supra note 41, at 41.
57. Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary in the Gulf of Maine Area, 1984 I.C.J.
246, 344 (Oct. 12).
58. Id. at 344.
59. See President Barack Obama, speech at COP 15 in Copenhagen, Denmark (Dec.
18, 2009), available at http://www.copenhagenclimatecouncil.com/get-informed/
news/cop15-remarks-of-president-barack-obama.html.
60. Efforts to address climate change impacts at a law and policy level include Kyoto
Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Dec. 11,
1997, 2303 U.N.T.S. 148 (entered into force Feb. 16, 2005); The U.N. Framework
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCC), May 9, 1982, 1771 U.N.T.S. 107 (entered into
force Mar. 24, 1994).
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Report,61 global atmospheric concentrations of carbon dioxide, methane,
and nitrous oxide have increased markedly as a result of human activities
since 1750 and now far exceed pre-industrial values determined from ice
cores spanning many thousands of years. Furthermore, the report’s
authors have identified carbon dioxide as the most important
anthropogenic greenhouse gas and have attributed the global increases in
carbon dioxide concentration primarily to fossil fuel use and land use
change, while those of methane and nitrous oxide were attributed
primarily to agriculture.62
In light of the potential opportunities available for renewable sources
of energy63 to address, to varying degrees, the three areas of concern
mentioned above, increasing attention is being paid to the use of the
ocean environment as a source of renewable energy by both Canada and
the United States. For example, in fiscal year 2008, the U.S. Department
of the Interior’s Minerals Management Service (MMS) awarded seven
new ocean environmental studies related to the Offshore Alternative
Energy Program (worth $3.8 million) to evaluate several aspects relating
to alternative energy.64 These studies were aimed at ensuring that the
environmental consequences of alternative energy siting, operations, and
interactions with other ocean resources are appropriately evaluated.65
Furthermore, in April 2009, under the authority granted in the Energy
Policy Act66 (2005), MMS finalized its Framework for Renewable
Energy Production in the United States.67 In addition to establishing a
process for granting leases, easements, and rights-of-way for offshore
61. Richard B. Alley et. al, Working Group 1 of the Intergovernmental Panel on
Climate Change, Summary for Policymakers, in CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: THE PHYSICAL
SCIENCE BASIS (Solomon, S., D. Qin, M. Manning, Z. Chen, M. Marquis, K.B. Averyt,
M.Tignor and H.L. Miller eds., Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, United
Kingdom, 2007), available at http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar4/wg1/ar4wg1-spm.pdf.
62. Id. at 2.
63. Alternative or renewable energy includes wind, solar, hydrokinetics (wave,
current, and tidal), and ocean thermal energy conversion (OTEC).
64. See U.S. Department of the Interior, Minerals Management Service Fact Sheet on
Environmental Studies Program, http://www.mms.gov/offshore/RenewableEnergy/
Studies.htm (last visited June 10, 2010).
65. Id.
66. The Energy Policy Act of 2005 granted the Interior Department’s Minerals
Management Service (MMS) the authority to regulate renewable energy development on
the OCS, but no action had previously been taken under that authority.
67. Renewable Energy and Alternate Uses of Existing Facilities on the Outer
Continental
Shelf,
30
CFR
Parts
250,
285,
290,
available
at
http://www.mms.gov/offshore/AlternativeEnergy/PDFs/AD30RenewableEnergy04-2209.pdf
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renewable energy development, the new program also established
methods for sharing revenues generated from Outer Continental Shelf
(OCS) renewable energy projects with adjacent coastal states.68 The
finalization of the program required an agreement69 between the
Department of the Interior and the Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission (FERC) to clarify jurisdictional understandings with respect
to renewable energy projects on the U.S. Outer Continental Shelf.70
Additionally, the framework will enhance partnerships with federal,
state, and local agencies and tribal governments to assist in maximizing
the economic and ecological benefits of OCS renewable energy
development.
At the state level, two New England states are working to address the
larger coastal community planning issues posed by siting renewable
energy projects in the ocean. Following the conclusions of the
Massachusetts Ocean Management Task Force in 2004 calling for a
comprehensive approach to coastal and ocean management, the
legislature passed the Massachusetts Oceans Act in 2008. The Act
requires the Secretary of Energy and Environmental Affairs to develop a
comprehensive ocean management plan, incorporating stakeholder input
and utilizing an Ocean Advisory Commission which includes an expert
in offshore renewable energy, and an Ocean Science Advisory Council.71
68. Note that the term “adjacent coastal States” refers to states within the United
States, not nation-states. This sharing of revenues in the Energy Policy Act raises an
interesting question for cross-border countries such as Canada and the United States
regarding the potential for shared revenues. Currently, the Act requires payment to
eligible states of twenty seven percent of the revenues from any projects located wholly
or partially within the area extending between three and six miles from shore. It also
requires equitable distribution of shared revenue among coastal states that are within
fifteen miles of the geographic center of the project. Given the potential for projects to
be within this geographic area of each other’s maritime boundary, would an agreement
for revenue sharing between the two countries be reasonable?
69. U.S. Department of the Interior & Federal Energy Regulatory Commission,
Memorandum of Understanding Between the U.S Department of the Interior and the
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (Apr. 9, 2009), available at http://www.mms.
gov/offshore/AlternativeEnergy/PDFs/DOI_FERC_MOU.pdf.
70. Under the agreement, the MMS has exclusive jurisdiction with regard to the
production, transportation, or transmission of energy from non-hydrokinetic renewable
energy projects, including wind and solar. FERC will have exclusive jurisdiction to issue
licenses for the construction and operation of hydrokinetic projects, including wave and
current, but companies will be required to first obtain a lease through MMS.
71. EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF ENERGY AND ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS, MASSACHUSETTS
OCEAN MANAGEMENT PLAN (December 31, 2009), available at http://www.env.
state.ma.us/eea/mop/final-v1/v1-complete.pdf [hereinafter MASSACHUSETTS OCEAN
MANAGEMENT PLAN].
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The final plan was promulgated on December 31, 2009, and guides the
siting of renewable energy projects in Massachusetts’ waters.72 Rhode
Island has embarked on a similar comprehensive planning process to
support a goal of obtaining fifteen percent (1.3 million MW-h-per year)
of state energy requirements from wind energy resources by 2015. The
Rhode Island Coastal Resources Management Council (CRMC), the
state’s coastal zone management agency, is developing the Ocean
Special Area Management Plan (Ocean SAMP) which will define use
zones for Rhode Island’s offshore waters through a research and
planning process that integrates the best available science with open
public input and involvement.73 The Ocean SAMP will be completed by
June 2010. To prepare for the future development of an offshore wind
farm, the Rhode Island Office of Energy Resources issued a request for
proposals in 2008, selecting Deepwater Wind in October 2008. Once the
Ocean SAMP is adopted by CRMC and subsequently by NOAA, the
permitting and review process will commence with the selected
developer.74 In addition, although not as comprehensive a planning
exercise as undertaken by Massachusetts and Rhode Island, a number of
other states have begun the process of developing a regulatory
framework specifically for offshore wind projects. This is mainly
because, as noted in the report to the Governor of Michigan by the
Michigan Great Lakes Wind Council (September 2009),
A process for approving or denying offshore use of the
Michigan’s Great Lakes bottomlands for wind energy does not
currently exist. If an application were received today, the state’s
review process would prove inadequate and would likely lead to
confusion within government agencies as well as for the
applicant and the public.75
Although only two offshore wind energy projects have formally been
proposed in the U.S. Northeast region, at least twenty other separate
projects may be proposed in the near future.76 The most prominent

72. Id.
73. See generally Rhode Island Ocean Special Area Management Plan,
http://seagrant.gso.uri.edu/oceansamp/ (last visited June 10, 2010).
74. See Background Document of Marine Renewable Energy Projects, at 5, Marine
Law Symposium, Roger Williams University School of Law, Oct. 23-24, 2008.
75. MICHIGAN GREAT LAKES WIND COUNCIL, REPORT OF THE MICHIGAN GREAT LAKES
WIND COUNCIL 4 (2009), available at http://www.michiganglowcouncil.org/
GLOW%20Report%209-1-09_FINAL.pdf.
76. Pudden & VanderZwaag, supra note 41, at 42.
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project77 is that of Cape Wind Associates (CWA), which proposes to
construct a wind farm on Horseshoe Shoal, located between Cape Cod
and Nantucket, in Nantucket Sound, Massachusetts.78 The CWA project
would have 130 wind turbines located as close as 4.1 miles offshore of
Cape Cod in an area of approximately twenty four square miles with the
turbines being placed at a minimum of one-third-miles apart.79 The
turbines will be connected by cables, which will relay the energy to shore
and the power grid. If constructed, the turbines would preempt other
bottom uses in an area, similar to oil and natural gas leases. The
potential impacts associated with the CWA offshore wind energy project
include the construction, operation, and removal of turbine platforms and
transmission cables; thermal and vibration impacts; and changes to
species assemblages within the area from the introduction of vertical
structures.80
In Canada, there has not been a comparable level of federal activity
as in the United States and there is currently only one offshore marine
renewable energy project in the developmental stage on Canada’s East
coast.81 Unlike the focus taken in the U.S. Northeast, efforts to advance
offshore renewable energy in the Canadian Maritime provinces are
focused on hydrokinetic technologies rather than wind, although there is
growing attention for onshore wind generation in each of the three
provinces. At the provincial level, the government of Nova Scotia
77. A second project is proposed by the Long Island Power Authority (LIPA) off
Long Island, New York. See Rusty Russell, Neither Out Far Nor In Deep: The Prospects
for Utility-Scale Wind Power in the Coastal Zone, 31 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 221, n.31
(2004).
78. See Michael Schultz, Questions Blowing in the Wind: The Development of
Offshore Wind as a Renewable Source of Energy in the United States, 38 NEW ENG. L.
REV. 415, 421-422 (2004).
79. See id. at 422.
80. See U.S. Department of the Interior, DOI News, Secretary Salazar Announces
Approval of Cape Wind Energy Project on Outer Continental Shelf of Massachusetts,
Apr. 28, 2010, http://www.doi.gov/news/doinews/Secretary-Salazar-AnnouncesApproval-of-Cape-Wind-Energy-Project-on-Outer-Continental-Shelf-offMassachusetts.cfm.
81. In Canada, Nova Scotia is currently examining the policy and legal framework for
exploiting in-stream tidal energy from the Bay of Fundy. See Government of Nova
Scotia, Government Home, Energy, Renewables, Public Education, Tidal, Nova Scotia
Renewables Public Education in Tidal Energy http://www.gov.ns.ca/energy/
renewables/public-education/tidal.asp (last visited June 10, 2010); GEORGE HAGERMAN &
ROGER BEDARD, EPRI, NOVA SCOTIA TIDAL IN-STREAM ENERGY CONVERSION (TISEC):
SURVEY AND CHARACTERIZATION OF POTENTIAL PROJECT SITES (Oct. 2, 2006), available
at http://oceanenergy.epri.com/attachments/streamenergy/ reports/Tidal_003_ME_Site_
Survey_Report_REV_1.pdf.
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required that a Strategic Environmental Assessment be conducted on
Fundy Tidal Energy to provide guidance on exploitation and the potential
impacts of renewable ocean energy.82 Somewhat consistent with the
broader, integrated planning efforts undertaken by Massachusetts and
Rhode Island, Recommendation 25 from the OEER Technical Advisory
Group to the Nova Scotia Department of Energy called for the Province
of Nova Scotia to develop an Integrated Coastal Zone Management
Policy for the Bay of Fundy before large scale commercial marine
renewable energy developments are allowed to proceed. The province
should involve communities and stakeholders in the development of the
policy and should undertake to resource that involvement.83
Interestingly, Recommendation 2984 from the same report called for a
major inter-jurisdictional workshop in 2009 involving Nova Scotia and
New Brunswick, Canada, and Maine to examine integrated management
issues and organization options for the Bay of Fundy.85
Despite lessons learned in international law over principles guiding
the exploitation of transboundary offshore non-renewable energy
resources and the development of cooperative agreements between states
driven by oil and gas resources,86 very little attention is currently being
paid in anticipation of the bilateral jurisdictional issues surrounding
offshore renewable energy. According to a recent estimate from NOAA,
approximately thirty-eight renewable energy projects in the U.S.
Northeast are currently in various stages of approval from MMS and
FERC and, among these, it would appear that approximately eight are
within some proximity to the Hague Line.87 As with cross-border
nonrenewable resources, it seems reasonable to expect that countries
would look to UNCLOS as one of the key drivers in providing guidance
related to the development of international law affecting renewable
82. OEER TECHNICAL ADVISORY GROUP, FUNDY TIDAL ENERGY STRATEGIC
ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT FINAL REPORT (Apr. 2008), available at
https://www.oreg.ca/docs/Fundy_SEA.pdf
83. Id.at 71.
84. Id. at 83.
85. The authors are not aware that this activity has occurred.
86. For a discussion on the subject of emerging international environmental law and
policy with respect to the rules of engagement for cross border oil and gas development,
see Peter D. Cameron, The Rules of Engagement: Developing Cross-Border Petroleum
Deposits in the North Sea and the Caribbean, 55 ICLQ 559 (2006).
87. Lopez, Marine Renewable Energy: Growing Demands on NOAA and Our Oceans,
Marine Law Symposium Roger Williams University School of Law, Oct. 24, 2008,
available at http://www.nmfs.noaa.gov/ habitat/habitatprotection/oceanrenewableenergy/
documents/Comments_and_Presentations/Presentations/RWmarinelawsymposium_oct20
08.pdf.
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energy resources.88 Two key articles of the Convention that would be
applicable are those pertaining to the sovereign right of the state for
purposes of exploring and exploiting, conserving, and managing natural
resources,89 and a coastal state’s sovereign rights to explore the seabed
and exploit its natural resources.90 At the same time, it has been debated
whether it is “unlawful” for a sovereign state to unilaterally exploit a
common petroleum resource or whether the international legal regime is
simply providing “rules of engagement” for cooperation.91 Scholars have
also drawn attention to Article 142 of the Convention, where resource
deposits straddle maritime boundaries. Accordingly, prior notification
to, and prior consent of, the coastal state is required when exploitation in
a given area may result in exploitation of resources lying within national
jurisdiction.92
Given this level of complexity and legal uncertainty surrounding a
“fixed” resource such as a petroleum deposit, it is difficult to predict how
the legal regime regarding dynamic renewable resources in a crossborder situation might unfold. It may very likely be that, rather than
looking for guidance from examples of nonrenewable resource decisions,
more relevant insights might be obtained from decisions and agreements
relating to how a coastal state manages its migratory living marine
resources, nested within the evolving practice of integrated management
and the application of an ecosystem-based approach.
IV. OCEAN PLANNING TRENDS IN THE U.S. AND CANADA
As with most coastal nations, sectoral ocean uses in the United States
and Canada developed in isolation from each other, with different needs
and technologies, separate networks, communications, and practices.93
This has resulted in autonomous sectors, having minimal or no links
between them.94 Such a fragmentary approach may have been adequate
88. See United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea art. 234, Dec. 10, 1982,
1833 U.N.T.S. 397.
89. Id. art. 56(1)(a).
90. Id. art. 77(1) & (2).
91. Cameron, supra note 86, at 561.
92. Id. at 567.
93. Scott Coffen-Smout, Final Report of the Canadian Ocean Assessment: A Review
of Canadian Ocean Policy and Practice (1996); Lawrence Juda, Changing National
Approaches to Ocean Governance: The United States, Canada, and Australia, 34
OCEAN DEV. & INT’L L. 161 (2003)
94. For example, to manage its coastal and ocean activities, twenty-nine federal
departments and agencies have direct oceans-related programs with a suite of associated
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early in the twentieth century. However, it has proven to be highly
dysfunctional in the last quarter, an era of rapid technological change,
many ocean uses and an increasing display of multiple-use conflicts,
particularly in the resource-rich waters overlying the continental shelf.
Additional factors further complicating efforts at ocean governance have
been identified as the fluid, three-dimensional nature of the medium; the
complexity of the interactive ecosystems; mobility and opacity of
resources and activities; and the mismatch between administrative
boundaries and jurisdictional authorities and the natural environment.95
To address the sectoral shortcoming to ocean-related policy
formulation, the past two decades have seen an increasing call for coastal
states to adopt an integrated approach to policy, program, and planning
development.96 For the United States and Canada, efforts to respond
institutionally and legislatively to a practice that would support a more
holistic approach to management have been positive, albeit slow.97
Reviews by both American and Canadian scholars have highlighted the
progress made by the countries as each attempted to shift from a single
sector, “silo” approach to one that is more reflective of
interconnectivities between the multiple users and uses of the coastal and
ocean environments.98 Strategies adopted for implementing integrated

laws and statutes. Government of Canada, Fisheries and Oceans Canada, The Role of the
Canadian Government in the Ocean Sector (2009), available at http://www.dfompo.gc.ca/oceans/publications/cg-gc/index-eng.htm. At the provincial and territorial
level, some seventy-six departments and agencies, with authority under approximately
200 pieces of legislation, exercise some role with respect to ocean-related programs and
activities. Government of Canada, The Role of the Provinces and Territories in the
Ocean Sector (2009), available at http://www.dfo-mpo.gc.ca/oceans/publications/pggp/index-eng.htm.
95. Alastair Couper, History of Ocean Management, in OCEAN MGMT. IN GLOBAL
CHANGE 1 (Paolo Fabri ed., 1992).
96. See e.g., United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, June 314, 1992, Rio Declaration on the Environment and Development, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF.151/26 (Aug. 12, 1992) [hereinafter Rio Declaration].
97. Betsy Baker, Filling an Arctic Gap: Legal and Regulatory Possibilities for
Canadian-U.S. Cooperation in the Beaufort Sea, 34 VT. L. REV. 57 (2009).
98. See id.; Aldo Chircop & Larry Hildebrand, Beyond the Buzzwords: A Perspective
on Integrated Coastal and Ocean Management in Canada, in TOWARDS PRINCIPLED
OCEANS GOVERNANCE 19 (Donald Rothwell & David VanderZwaag eds., 2006); Lucia
Fanning, Towards an Understanding of the Role of Core Values and Policy Networks to
Influence Decision-Making in an Evolving Ocean Governance Era: A Maritimes Canada
Study (2003) (unpublished PhD Thesis, on file with Dalhousie University); Juda, supra
note 93; C.L. Mitchell, Sustainable Oceans Development: the Canadian Approach, 22
MARINE POLICY 393 (1998); Robert O’Boyle & Glen Jamieson, Observations on the
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management and an ecosystem-based approach have also varied between
the two countries, with the United States focusing initially on developing
a federal Coastal Zone Management Act99 in 1972 and Canada following
some twenty-five years later with enabling legislation for the oceans with
the passage of its Oceans Act.100 Nonetheless, while following different
paths, it seems that there is evidence to support the hope that each
country has now committed to “adapt its practice to the science that has
consistently shown that ecosystem-based, as opposed to sectoral, oceans
management is the route to healthier and more productive oceans.”101
A. Canada’s Ocean Management Regime
Canada’s Ocean Act and its subsequently developed Ocean
Strategy102 and Ocean Action Plan103 reflect the underlying principles,
current approach, and priorities that Canada intends to apply with respect
to managing its coastal and ocean activities.
The need to increase policy coordination and coherence horizontally
amongst responsible government agencies and vertically amongst
responsible jurisdictions has been recognized in Canada’s Oceans Act.104
This legislation, inter alia¸ brought Canadian law in line with
internationally agreed-upon jurisdiction for the oceans, increased the
authority of the Ministry of Fisheries and Oceans to deal with oceans
management, and introduced a new mechanism, known as ‘integrated
management,’ to Canadian oceans management. Part I of the Act
comprehensively states Canada’s position to assume its rights and
responsibilities over maritime zones, as granted to coastal states under
UNCLOS.105 Sections 4 through 19 assert Canada’s claims over its
maritime zones, consistent with customary international law and
UNCLOS, even though Canada had not at the time ratified the
Implementation of Ecosystem-Based Management: Experiences on Canada’s East and
West Coasts 79 FISHERIES RESEARCH 1 (2006).
99. Coastal Zone Management Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1451-56 (1972).
100. Oceans Act, 1996 S.C., c. 31.
101. Baker, supra note 97, at 82.
102. FISHERIES AND OCEANS CANADA, CANADA’S OCEANS STRATEGY: OUR OCEANS,
OUR FUTURE: POLICY AND OPERATIONAL FRAMEWORK FOR INTEGRATED MANAGEMENT OF
THE ESTUARINE, COASTAL AND MARINE ENVIRONMENTS IN CANADA (2002), www.dfompo.gc.ca/oceans/publications/cos-soc/pdf/cos-soc-eng.pdf.
103. FISHERIES AND OCEANS CANADA, CANADA’S OCEANS ACTION P LAN: FOR PRESENT
AND FUTURE GENERATIONS (2005), www.dfo-mpo.gc.ca/canwaters-eauxcan/oap-pao/pdf/
oap_e.pdf.
104. Oceans Act, 1996 S.C., c. 31.
105. Id. part 1.
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Convention. This Part of the Act also asserts the rights of Canada over
the seabed and subsoil in internal waters,106 the territorial sea,107 the
Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ),108 and the continental shelf,109 in
accordance with the Act and international law.
Part II of the Act allows for the development and implementation of
a national oceans strategy for the management of estuarine, coastal, and
marine ecosystems in Canadian waters.110 The principles of sustainable
development, integrated management, and the precautionary approach to
be used in guiding the development of the strategy are articulated. The
legal responsibility for leading and facilitating its development and
implementation is assigned to the Minister of Fisheries and Oceans, in
collaboration with a suite of listed agencies and bodies. Included in Part
II are the basic authorities and tools to be used to define the parameters
of the oceans strategy. These include: the establishment of marine
protected areas;111 the establishment and enforcement of marine
environmental quality guidelines, criteria, and standards for the purposes
of implementing integrated management plans;112 and the development
and implementation of integrated management plans.113 However,
Section 31 the Act limits Ministerial implementation of the integrated
management plans within those areas assigned by law to DFO.114 This
Part of the Act also allows for the creation or recognition of advisory
bodies115 and ends with a restatement of provisions for enforcement and
penalties that are included in the criminal code.116
Part III of the Act names the Minister of Fisheries and Oceans as the
lead federal authority responsible for oceans.117 The powers, duties, and
functions of this role are detailed, including new responsibilities for the
coast guard,118 the provision of hydrographic services,119 as well as

106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.

Id. part 1, §6.
Id. part 1, §4.
Id. part 1, §13.
Id. part 1, §17.
Id. part 2.
Id. part 2, §35.
Id. part 2, §31.
Id. part 2, §32
Id. part 2, §31.
Id.
Id. part 2, §37.
Id. part 3, §37.
Id. part 3, §41
Id. part 3, §45
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marine
scientific
advice
supporting
ocean
management
responsibilities.120
The Oceans Act has the potential to restructure, consolidate and
create a holistic approach to oceans management which could provide a
mechanism for balancing the many competing ocean interests. However,
it has been criticized for not living up to expectations, primarily by
Canadian scholars.121 The academic literature focuses on two particular
elements of the Act: “fragmentation” and “integrated management,” and
it faults the Act for failing to reduce fragmentation in oceans
management and failing to define many of the terms crucial to
implementing integrated management.122
An attempt to address these shortcomings is evident in Canada’s
Ocean Strategy (the Strategy), released almost six years after being
legislated for in Part II of the Oceans Act. The goal of the Strategy is “to
ensure healthy, safe and prosperous oceans for the benefit of current and
future generations of Canadians.”123 The Strategy sets out the policy
direction for ocean management in Canada and focuses on policies and
programs aimed at understanding and protecting the marine environment;
supporting sustainable economic opportunities; and providing
international leadership.124
The commitment to work collaboratively with all levels of
government and to adopt a participatory principle with regards to
engaging Canadians in meeting the objectives of the Strategy is
declared.125 The framework envisions this being accomplished with a
specific geographic focus—through collaboration among governmental
and non-governmental representatives with interests in a given area of
ocean space, either offshore (large ocean management areas) or in areas
designated as coastal management areas. Mechanisms to solicit
120. Id. part 3, §42.
121. Aldo Chircop, Hugh Kindred, Phillip Saunders & David VanderZwaag,
Legislating for Integrated Marine Management: Canada’s proposed Oceans Act of 1996,
33 CANADIAN YEARBOOK OF INT’L L. 305 (1995); Aldo Chircop and Bruce Marchand,
Oceans Act: Uncharted Seas for Offshore Development in Atlantic Canada? 24
DALHOUSIE L.J. 23 (2001); Chircop & Hildebrand, supra note 98; Sylvie Guénette &
Jackie Alder, Lessons from Marine Protected Areas and Integrated Oceans Management
Initiatives in Canada, 35 COASTAL MGMT. 51 (2007); John Kearney, et al., The Role of
Participatory Governance and Community-Based Management in Integrated Coastal and
Ocean Management in Canada, 35 COASTAL MGMT. 79 (2007).
122. McCrimmon & Lucia Fanning, Critiquing Canada’s Ocean Act: A Review of the
1995-2008 Academic Literature, (forthcoming).
123. Supra note 102, at 10.
124. Id. at 12.
125. Id. at 18.
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stakeholder input and improve coordination in ocean management
include the establishment of new and existing committees, management
boards, and other forms of information sharing. Secondly, the Strategy
identifies integrated management as the cornerstone of Canadian ocean
governance and notes the explicit link between conservation and
protection of ecosystems, while at the same time providing opportunities
for creating wealth in oceans-related economies and communities.126 It
also highlights the adoption of sustainable development explicitly, with
its reference to bringing together “the environmental, economic and
social considerations by planning for sustainable use of the oceans in a
safe and secure environment.”127 Finally, the Strategy recognizes the
need to engage Canadians in promoting stewardship and awareness of
the oceans for present and future generations.
Critiques of the Strategy have focused on the general nature of the
policy, recognizing that as a national policy, specificities would have to
be addressed in the more detailed integrated management plans.128 While
adopting an ecosystem approach, it was noted that the boundaries of the
proposed large ocean management areas appeared to be more
administratively and jurisdictionally based than functional or ecosystembased.129 Efforts at integrated management and collaborative processes
were viewed as a plus. However, a gap was noted in the need to clarify
the accountability structure in the event of problems arising as a result of
actions undertaken by these collaborative mechanisms, consisting of
government and non-government actors.130 The Strategy was also
criticized for lacking the appropriate evaluation mechanism to fully
capture the lessons learned from its “learning by doing” adaptive
approach.131
Complementary to the Strategy, Canada’s Ocean Action Plan,
released in May 2005, outlined the priorities for action and allocated
some twenty-eight million dollars to implement these activities over a
two-year period. Four main areas of focus were outlined for action. The
first activity addressed “International Leadership, Sovereignty and
Security,” in which efforts to work collaboratively with the United States
in the Gulf of Maine to address transboundary fisheries management and
improve environmental protection emergency response were identified.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.

Id. at 19.
Id. at v.
Chircop & Hildebrand, supra note 98.
Id. at 28.
Id. at 34.
Id.
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The second activity focused on implementing “Integrated Management”
planning for five large ocean management areas, including continuing
the efforts to develop an Eastern Scotian Shelf Integrated Management
Plan. The third activity centered on “Health of the Oceans” and the
development of a Federal Marine Protected Areas Strategy and greater
enforcement activity on Canada’s east coast to better identify and
investigate marine pollution from ships transiting Canadian waters. The
fourth area of emphasis addressed “Science and Technology” with the
development of an Ocean Technology Network.
Current efforts to advance integrated management on the Maritimes
Region of Canada have focused on the adoption of marine spatial
planning (MSP) and the legislative framework needed to facilitate MSP
implementation.132 The slow pace of implementation of an Integrated
Management approach has led to suggestions for policy renewal,
program review, and critical analysis. The potential ability of MSP to
meet the intent of the Oceans Act and the expectations of the engaged
public citizenry that has participated in the development process of
integrated management to date was considered significant, particularly in
light of the lessons being learned internationally.
Based on a preliminary analysis,133 it would appear that Canada has
at least three options for creating a functional MSP regime: (i) amending
the Oceans Act, (ii) reinterpreting the Oceans Act; and (iii) using a
Federal Cabinet Directive. However, any of these methods would
require significant political consensus, as will the long-term application
of any marine spatial plan. An MSP regime established by the Canadian
federal government will also have to address its inability to manage the
governing competencies granted to the provinces by the Constitution
Act.134 This can be done through the creation of Memorandums of
Understanding (MOUs) with the provinces but, given the jurisdictional
complexity in Canada, their necessity may make marine spatial plans in
some regions impractical. For example, while in theory the Gulf of St.
132. In conjunction with the Marine Affairs Program, Dalhousie University, DFO
Maritimes and Gulf regions, held a Learning Session on November 25, 2009 in
Dartmouth, Nova Scotia entitled “Why Consider Marine Spatial Planning (MSP)? Does
MSP provide an implementation mechanism for an integrated approach to coastal and
oceans management and planning in a regional Atlantic Canadian context?” The intent of
the learning session was to consider the suitability of MSP as a tool and process to
advance the implementation of integrated approaches to coastal and oceans management
in Canada.
133. McCrimmon & Lucia Fanning, Marine Spatial Planning: International Lessons
for Canadian Development (forthcoming).
134. Constitution Act, 1982, c. 3 U.K..
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Lawrence would be an ideal location for MSP based on its ecology and
high usage, the need to coordinate management between multiple
federal, provincial, municipal, and aboriginal governments and
government agencies make successful MSP in the region unlikely. On
the other hand, areas like the Eastern Scotian Shelf Integrated
Management (ESSIM) area and the Bay of Fundy and the Gulf of Maine
are likely better candidates for successful marine spatial plans in Canada.
B. U.S. Ocean Planning
Pursuant to the Oceans Act of 2000, the United States established a
sixteen-member Commission on Ocean Policy (the Commission) “to
make recommendations for coordinated and comprehensive national
ocean policy.”135 The Commission issued its final report—”An Ocean
Blueprint for the 21st Century”—in September 2004.136 The report
contained over 200 recommendations for U.S. ocean and coastal
policy.137 In response to some of these recommendations, President
George W. Bush established a Committee on Ocean Policy138 as part of
the Council on Environmental Quality, a coordinating body within the
Executive Office of the President.139 Shortly thereafter, the Commission
expired under the terms of the Ocean Act of 2000.140
In the meantime, the national interest in marine renewable energies
blossomed. A proposal to establish the first U.S. off-shore wind farm off
the coast of Massachusetts grabbed the nation’s attention and forced
Massachusetts to examine its coastal and marine priorities. Indeed, as
explained above, the state passed its own Oceans Act in 2008, calling for
a comprehensive ocean management plan. As required, the Executive

135. Oceans Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-256, 114 Stat. 644 (2000) (codified as
amended at 33 U.S.C. § 857-19 (2001)).
136. U.S. Commission on Ocean Policy, An Ocean Blueprint for the 21st Century
(2004), available at http://oceancommission.gov/documents/full_color_rpt/welcome.html
(last visited June 10, 2010).
137. Id.
138. See id.
139. The Council on Environmental Quality was established pursuant to the National
Environmental Policy Act of 1969. National Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. §
4321 (1969). See also The White House, Home, The Administration, Council on
Environmental
Quality,
The
Council
on
Environmental
Quality-About,
http://www.whitehouse.gov/ administration/eop/ceq/about (last visited June 10, 2010).
140. See 33 U.S.C. § 857-19(Sec. 3)(f)(2)(i) (“The Commission shall cease to exist 90
days after the date on which it submits its final report.”).
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Office of Energy and Environmental Affairs delivered a final
Massachusetts Ocean Management Plan on December 31, 2009.141
Rhode Island also undertook marine spatial planning in response to
off-shore wind development opportunities. Led by the Rhode Island
Coastal Resources Management Council, a project is underway to create
an ocean Special Area Management Plan (SAMP) to designate specific
use zones of Rhode Island’s state waters.142
Incentives to develop marine renewable energy have also arisen in
recent years. The federal government has offered financial incentives to
investment firms who invest in marine renewable technologies while also
issuing grants and loans directly to renewable energy developers under
the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act and the Omnibus
Appropriations Act for fiscal year 2009.143 In addition, project approval
delays and regulatory uncertainty caused by jurisdictional battles
between the MMS and FERC were reduced by their recent MOU.144
Following this agreement, MMS was able to “establish a new regulatory
regime for wind, wave, current, solar and other emerging technologies”
on the Outer Continental Shelf.145
President Barack Obama’s administration not only announced
significant national interest in developing marine renewable energy, it
also recognized the growing competition for use of marine environments
and the need for ocean use planning. Accordingly, in June 2009
President Obama established the Interagency Ocean Policy Task Force
(the Task Force).146 The Task Force is led by the White House Council

141. MASSACHUSETTS OCEAN MANAGEMENT PLAN, supra note 71.
142. See Rhode Island Ocean Special Area Management Plan, About Us,
http://seagrant.gso.uri.edu/ oceansamp/about.html (last visited June 10, 2010).
143. Peter J. Schaumburg and Ami M. Grace-Tardy, The Dawn of Federal Marine
Renewable Energy Development, 24 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV’T 15, 16 (2010).
144. Id. (citing U.S. Department of the Interior & FERC, Memorandum of
Understanding Between the U.S. Department of the Interior and the Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission (Apr. 9, 2009), available at www.mms.gov/offshore/
AlternativeEnergy/PDFs/DOI_FERC_MOU.pdf). Prior to the MOU, each agency
believed it had authority over renewable energy projects on the Outer Continental Shelf
pursuant to the Energy Policy Act of 2005, which amended the Outer Continental Shelf
Lands Act, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1331-56(a) (2005). Id.
145. Id.
146. The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, Memorandum for the Heads of
Executive Departments and Agencies (June 12, 2009), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/ page/files/2009ocean_ mem_rel.pdf.
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Its charge includes “developing a
on Environmental Quality.147
recommendation for a national policy that ensures protection,
maintenance, and restoration of oceans, our coasts and the Great Lakes”
and recommending “a framework for improved stewardship, and
effective coastal and marine spatial planning.”148
The Task Force issued its interim report on September 10, 2009. In
preparing the report, the Task Force consulted the report prepared by the
U.S. Commission on Ocean Policy.149 The Task Force gently suggested
that the Committee on Ocean Policy established following that report
was only “moderately effective” in bringing federal agencies together to
coordinate national ocean policy, and that there was much room for
improvement in setting a strong overarching policy for national ocean
priorities; getting high-level direction and policy guidance from a “clear
and identifiable authority;” and creating enhanced “ongoing and active
engagement with state, tribal, and local authorities, and regional
governance structures” among other things.150
To facilitate implementation of the numerous proposed ocean policy
goals, the Task Force called for creation of a National Ocean Council
(NOC).151 This body would consist of both principal-level administrators
and deputy-level administrators,152 presumably to ensure appropriate
decision-making authority while also carrying out the decisions through
147. See The White House, Council on Environmental Quality, The Interagency Ocean
Policy Task Force, http://www.whitehouse.gov/administration/eop/ceq/initiatives/oceans
(last visited June 10, 2010).
148. Id.
149. THE WHITE HOUSE COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY, INTERIM REPORT OF
THE INTERAGENCY OCEAN POLICY TASK FORCE 3 (Sept. 10, 2009), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/assets/documents/09_17_09_Interim_Report_of_Task_Force
_FINAL2.pdf.
150. Id. at 6.
151. Id. at 18.
152. Id. (“Members of the NOC would include: the Secretaries of State, Defense, the
Interior, Agriculture, Health and Human Services, Commerce, Labor, Transportation,
Energy and Homeland Security; the Attorney General; the Administrator of the
Environmental Protection Agency; the Chair of the Council on Environmental Quality
(CEQ); the Director of the Office of Management and Budget (OMB); the Administrator
of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration; the Director of National
Intelligence; the Director of the Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP); the
Director of the National Science Foundation; the Chairman of the Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission; the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; the Assistants to the
President for National Security Affairs, Homeland Security, Domestic Policy, and
Economic Policy; an employee of the United States designated by the Vice President; and
such other officers or employees of the United States as the Co-Chairs may from time to
time designate.”).
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action. The NOC would be responsible for advising the President on the
“National Policy for the Stewardship of the Ocean, Our Coasts and the
Great Lakes,” and would also have overall responsibility for
implementing the National Policy.153 To carry out its functions, the NOC
would be comprised of a steering committee, an Ocean Resource
Management Interagency Policy Committee, an Ocean Science and
Technology Interagency Policy Committee, and a Governance Advisory
Committee.154 The latter would consist of members representing states,
tribes, and regional governance structures, and would “provide input to
the NOC on issues of inter-jurisdictional collaboration and cooperation
on the National Policy and related matters.”155
One of the nine priority objectives listed in the Task Force’s Interim
Report is coastal and marine spatial planning (CMSP).156 Accordingly,
on December 9, 2009, the Task Force issued another report titled
“Interim Framework for Effective Coastal and Marine Spatial
Planning.”157 The report notes that most federal permitting processes for
myriad ocean uses “focus solely on a limited range of management tools
and outcomes” rather than incorporating a “more integrated,
comprehensive, ecosystem-based, flexible, and proactive approach to
planning and managing these uses and activities.”158 The proposed
framework for CMSP “is intended to yield substantial economic,
ecological, and social benefits” by incorporating “principles of sound
science for ecosystem-based and adaptive management,” and by being
“transparent” and “informed by stakeholders and the public.”159
The report notes that many of the federal administrative agencies
responsible for planning with respect to the ocean, coasts, and Great
Lakes are already authorized by their enabling legislation to implement
CMSP “consistent with and under the authority of these statutes.”160 The
framework is simply in place to “provide all agencies with agreed upon

153.
154.
155.
156.
157.

Id. at 20.
Id. at 22, 23, 24.
Id. at 24.
Id. at 7.
WHITE HOUSE COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY, INTERAGENCY OCEAN
POLICY TASK FORCE, INTERIM FRAMEWORK FOR EFFECTIVE COASTAL AND MARINE
SPATIAL
P LANNING
(2009),
available
at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/
sites/default/files/microsites/091209-Interim-CMSP-Framework-Task-Force.pdf
[hereinafter INTERAGENCY OCEAN POLICY TASK FORCE INTERIM FRAMEWORK FOR
CMSP].
158. Id. at 1-2.
159. Id. at 3.
160. Id. at 6.
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principles and goals to guide their actions under their authorities, and to
develop mechanisms so that federal, state, tribal, and local authorities,
and regional governance structures, can proactively and cooperatively
work together to exercise their respective authorities.”161 If, however,
any agency identifies a procedural or substantive legal constraint
preventing full cooperation with the CMSP guidelines, the NOC would
work with the agency to evaluate whether legislative or regulatory
changes are necessary and appropriate.162
Among the several guiding principles for CMSP, necessary to
achieve the nation’s goals, are that CMSP Plans would be: informed by
“the best available science-based information, including the natural and
social sciences;” guided by the precautionary approach as set forth in the
Rio Declaration;163 and “implemented in accordance with customary
international law, including as reflected in the 1982 Law of the Sea
Convention, and with treaties and other international agreements to
which the United States is a party.”164
The geographic scope of the CMSP planning area in the United
States would include the territorial sea, EEZ, and the Continental Shelf,
and would “extend landward to the mean high-water line.”165 In the
Great Lakes region, the geographic scope of the planning area extends
from the ordinary high-water mark to the limit of the U.S.-Canada
international boundary.166 Excluded are the submerged lands underlying
the Great Lakes, which, on the U.S. side, are “entirely under the
jurisdiction and ownership of the Great Lakes States.”167 No specific
mention is made of the Gulf of Maine region or any other geographical
region shared with Canada or Mexico.
To implement CMSP, the report calls for the United States to be
subdivided into nine regional planning areas. The areas would be based
on the large marine ecosystem (LME) scale, “defined on the basis of

161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Id. Principle 15 of the Rio Declaration provides: “In order to protect the
environment, the precautionary approach shall be widely applied by States according to
their capabilities. Where there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full
scientific certainty shall not be used as a reason for postponing cost-effective measures to
prevent environmental degradation.” Rio Declaration, supra note 96, at Annex I,
Principle 15.
164. INTERAGENCY OCEAN POLICY TASK FORCE INTERIM FRAMEWORK FOR CMSP,
supra note 157, at 8.
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Id. at 9.
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consistent ecological conditions.”168 Modifications to the nine regional
planning areas would be made to accommodate existing state or regional
ocean governance bodies. The nine areas would include the Great Lakes,
the Mid-Atlantic, South Atlantic, Northeast, Gulf Coast, and West Coast,
as well as Alaska, the Pacific Islands, and the Caribbean.169 The report
calls on the NOC to facilitate regional CMS Plans for each of the nine
areas.170 Regional planning bodies would be created with membership
representing federal, state, and tribal interests “and indigenous
community representatives with jurisdictional responsibilities or other
interests (e.g., resource management, science, homeland and national
security, transportation and public health) relevant to CMSP for that
region.”171 The report calls for “ex officio” membership by adjacent
coastal states to encourage consistent planning among regions.172 Key to
the subject of this Article, moreover, the report acknowledges that the
United States shares maritime boundaries with Mexico and Canada and
suggests that the regional planning bodies “may include ex officio
representation or observers from those nations.”173
In creating the regional CMSP plans, the regional bodies are to
identify regional objectives and build upon existing planning efforts
(such as, for example, the Great Lakes Restoration Initiative Action Plan,
and the ocean plans prepared by Massachusetts and Rhode Island).174
Efforts made by adjacent coastal nations to plan adjoining waters would
be appropriately considered, therefore, in the regional planning efforts of
the relevant U.S. regions. This means Canada’s Eastern Scotian Shelf
Integrated Management plan should be among the plans considered by
the U.S. Northeast Region in preparing a CMSP for the Gulf of Maine
area.
IV. EXAMPLES OF BI-NATIONAL COOPERATION WITH REGARD TO
TRANSBOUNDARY WATER BODIES
There are numerous examples of U.S.-Canada collaborative
mechanisms, and a more recent count by the Gulf of Maine Council on
the Marine Environment has identified some fifty binding and nonbinding agreements that the two countries have entered into to manage
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.

Id. at 10-11.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 12.
Id.
Id. (emphasis added).
Id. at 14.
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cross-border issues.175 Not surprising, the overwhelming number of
these agreements are non-binding, with only eight having a mandatory
obligation on the parties to comply with the terms and conditions
identified therein.176 The need and importance of these agreements to
U.S.-Canada relations has been highlighted by numerous observers177 and
most recently, the Policy Research Initiative (PRI) of the Government of
Canada has joined with several other federal departments and outside
experts and stakeholders to examine the growing significance, scope, and
nature of cross-border regional relationships, and to explore their
importance for the Government of Canada. In the November 2008 Final
Report, the Director General of PRI stated:
Clearly, a turning point has been reached, where the
management of Canada-U.S. relations is evolving into something
much more dynamic and sophisticated—involving not only the
Canadian and U.S. federal governments, but the provinces and
states, private businesses and civil organizations as well, in a
plethora of informal and formal relationships and networks all
concerned with the practical problem-solving of common
challenges and issues in the border regions of Canada and the
United States. More than anything, this growing involvement of
players reflects a maturing of the Canada-U.S. relationship, and
nowhere is this more evident than in the borderland regions,
where cross-border regional relationships are flourishing.178
175. Gulf of Maine Council on the Marine Environment, Existing US-Canada
Agreements, prepared for GOMCME Meeting, 2009, Dartmouth, NS (on file with the
authors).
176. Key binding agreements include commitments made under the Boundary Waters
Treaty, Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement, the Migratory Birds Convention Treaty
and amendments to the Treaty, the North-West Atlantic Fisheries Organization and the
North American Salmon Conservation Organization.
177. See e.g., Baker, surpra note 97; Lawrence Hildebrand et al., Cooperative
Ecosystem Management Across the Canada–US Border: Approaches and Experiences of
Transboundary Programs in the Gulf of Maine, Great Lakes and Georgia Basin/Puget
Sound, 45 OCEAN & COASTAL MGMT. 421 (2002); Cynthia Lamson & David
VanderZwaag, Arctic Waters: Needs and Options for Canadian-American Cooperation,
18 OCEAN DEV. & INT’L L. 49 (1987); Pudden & VanderZwaag, supra note 41; Allen L.
Springer, North American Transjurisdictional Cooperation: The Gulf of Maine Council
on the Marine Environment, CANADIAN-AMERICAN PUBLIC POLICY (Apr. 2002).
178. GOVERNMENT OF CANADA, POLICY RESEARCH INSTITUTE, THE EMERGENCE OF
CROSS-BORDER REGIONS BETWEEN CANADA AND THE UNITED STATES: REAPING THE
PROMISE AND PUBLIC VALUE OF CROSS-BORDER REGIONAL RELATIONSHIPS, FINAL REPORT
iii (2008), available at http://www.policyresearch.gc.ca/page.asp? pagenm=20080002_01.

324

OCEAN AND COASTAL LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 15:2

To provide an understanding of the significance of these agreements
to the well-being of Canada-U.S. relations, the shared ecosystems and
the people who depend on them, this section will highlight two such
agreements. The first of these is the binding and long established Great
Lakes Water Quality Agreement and the second is the non-binding and
much more recent Joint Statement of Cooperation on the Georgia Basin
and Puget Sound Ecosystem.179
A. Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement
The Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement (GLWQA or the
Agreement) was first entered in 1972.180 It was a product of the
Boundary Waters Treaty of 1909—the foundation of U.S.-Canada
transboundary water management.181 The Boundary Water Treaty
provides for joint management between the countries of their shared
waterways, performed under the authority of the International Joint
Commission, a body with investigative and adjudicative authority whose
six politically-appointed members equally represent both nations.182
When, after World War II, scientists and others grew increasingly
alarmed at the poor water quality of the Great Lakes and their ongoing
degradation, the two nations knew something must be done. The
GLWQA was born out of concern over “grave deterioration of water
quality on each side of the boundary to an extent that is causing injury to
health and property on the other side.”183 The GLWQA set water quality
objectives and created programs to achieve them.184 It further defined the
functions of the International Joint Commission, transforming it into an
“environmental protection institution.”185 Under the Agreement, the IJC
is responsible for gathering, analyzing, and disseminating data from both
nations regarding water quality of the boundary waters, and advising the
authorities of both nations with regard to carrying out the terms of the

179. For a more detailed assessment of these two agreements, see Hildebrand et al.,
supra note 177.
180. Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement, U.S.-Can., Apr. 15, 1972, 23.1 U.S.T. 301
[hereinafter 1972 Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement].
181. Noah D. Hall, The Centennial of the Boundary Waters Treaty: A Century of
United States-Canadian Transboundary Water Management, 54 WAYNE L. REV. 1417,
1418 (2008).
182. Id. at 1422.
183. 1972 Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement, supra note 180.
184. Hall, supra note 181, at 1431.
185. Id. at 1423.
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Agreement.186 Thus, while the IJC is actively involved in overseeing the
GLWQA and helping to achieve its primary goals, the foremost
responsibility for enforcing the agreement and, in particular, the water
quality standards it contains, rests with the U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency and Environment Canada.187
The original GLWQA focused on phosphorous pollution, and while
it had some success in reducing the impact of phosphorous discharge on
the Great Lakes, scientific discoveries of other persistent organic
chemicals degrading the water tempered the Agreement’s overall
success.188 The Agreement was amended significantly in both 1978 and
1987, striving to eliminate the impact of toxic chemicals on the Lakes
and prevent new discharges of any additional toxic substances.189
The GLWQA has been criticized for its “sub-treaty status” (since it
was never approved by the U.S. Senate) and for lacking adequate
enforcement provisions.190 It is not, for example, easy for adversely
affected citizens to sue a responsible party for failure to enforce the
Agreement.191 Nonetheless, the ICJ has made efforts to include citizens
in its decision-making process. Following the ICJ’s twelfth biennial
report, released in 2004, the ICJ undertook a major public comment
period to determine how effective the CLWQA had been.192 The
synthesis of comments from over 4000 sources is included in a report the
ICJ issued in August 2006.193 The major recommendations of the report
are that the Parties, among other things:
•

•

Enter into a replacement Agreement that is more “actionoriented,” signed by the Canada’s Prime Minister and the
President of the United States, and endorsed by the Canadian
Parliament and the U.S. Congress.
Commit to creating a separate and enforceable bi-national
Action Plan that “engages federal, state, provincial and

186. 1972 Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement, supra note 180, at art. VII.
187. Hall, supra note 181, at 1432.
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. Id. at 1433.
191. Id.
192. See International Joint Commission, Canada & United States, Activities, The
Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement (GLWQA) review, http://www.ijc.org/en/
activities/consultations/glwqa/index.php (last visited June 10, 2010).
193. INTERNATIONAL JOINT COMMISSION, ADVICE TO THE GOVERNMENTS ON THEIR
REVIEW OF THE GREAT LAKES WATER QUALITY AGREEMENT (2006), available at
http://www.ijc.org/php/publications/pdf/ID1603.pdf.
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municipal departments and agencies, as well as Tribes and
First Nations” and contains clear accountability provisions.
Establish a Steering Committee for the GLWQA comprised
of heads of the Parties’ appropriate environmental protection
and related agencies.
Provide “a more clear and meaningful role” for the IJC in
implementing the Agreement.194

This increased public participation, to some, compensates for the
claim that GLWQA fails to contain adequate enforcement provisions.195
The fact that the parties turn, at least occasionally, to their citizens for
feedback creates accountability and political pressure to comply with the
Agreement.
As a model for the Gulf of Maine’s boundary waters, the GLWQA
has much to recommend, in particular the strong role of the IJC and the
representation by both parties on that commission. In addition, the lead
environmental agencies of both nations are responsible for protecting the
boundary waters of the Great Lakes, placing responsibility on the highest
administrative authorities with the greatest ability, in principle, to
mandate compliance and conduct enforcement.
The GLWQA’s
connection with the Boundary Waters Treaty elevates its status as a
binational policy tool, but its lack of treaty status and endorsement by
each nation’s legislative branch provides a lesson, for similar future
agreements, in what to avoid. Lastly, as is commonly understood in
ocean planning and other resource management programs today, public
participation and the inclusion of state, local, and tribal entities is also
key to sound decision-making, community support, and accountability.
B. Joint Statement of Cooperation on the Georgia Basin and Puget
Sound Ecosystem
The signing of the Statement of Cooperation by the Administrator of
the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (U.S.-EPA Region 10) and
Canada’s Minister of Environment in January 2000, advocating a
common framework for sustainability in the Georgia Basin and Puget
Sound Ecosystem,196 resulted from an ongoing historical practice of
194. Id. at 1-2.
195. Hall, supra note 181, at 1434.
196. See ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY & ENVIRONMENT CANADA, JOINT
STATEMENT OF COOPERATION ON THE GEORGIA BASIN AND PUGET SOUND ECOSYSTEM
(2000), available at http://www.epa.gov/region10/psgb/media/pdf/statement_of_
cooperation.pdf.
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working collaboratively to address transboundary and global challenges
confronting the shared ecosystem.
The ecosystem, known by the area’s tribal and First Nations peoples
as the Salish Sea, is comprised of the three basins of the Puget Sound,
Strait of Juan de Fuca, and the Strait of Georgia on the Pacific coast of
Canada and the United States. Known as the Georgia Basin and Puget
Sound Initiative, the area is considered one of the most ecologically
diverse in North America, possessing internationally significant species
and habitats. With a population of some seven million inhabitants,
pressures on the ecosystem include increasing population growth (at a
rate that makes it one of the highest in North America), industrial
expansion, and economic demands. These have led to poor air quality,
toxic contamination of marine and fresh water, loss or degradation of
farmlands, wetlands, and wildlife habitat, and decline of culturally
important species.197
The Statement of Cooperation promotes closer U.S.-Canada
collaboration in addressing challenges confronting the ecosystem and
serves to:
•
•
•
•

publicly confirm the commitment by the two federal levels
of government to transboundary collaboration for the health
of the Georgia Basin -Puget Sound ecosystem;
recognize the special role and interests of Coast Salish
Nations and Tribes;
acknowledge and support the excellent efforts in our region
related to ecosystem management; and,
establish a formal Canada-U.S. commitment at the regional
level to work cooperatively on the challenges identified In
the Statement of Cooperation, including sustainability.198

The Statement of Cooperation commits Environment Canada and the
U.S. EPA to develop annual action plans and report to the public on
progress. The most recent Action Plan (2008-2010) focuses on
transboundary collaboration, sharing knowledge and information, and
transboundary demonstration projects contributing to improved air
quality, water quality, and habitat and species health. While the
administration and management of the agreement are the responsibility
of the two federal agencies, a working group responsible for developing
the action plans and reporting on progress is comprised of additional
197. Hildebrand et. al, supra note 177, at 436.
198. See Joint Statement of Cooperation on the Georgia Basin and Puget Sound
Ecosystem, supra note 196.
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members from the Coast Salish Gathering Secretariats (representing
Nations and Tribes in the Georgia Basin-Puget Sound region), the British
Columbia Ministry of the Environment, Washington State Department of
Ecology, and the Puget Sound Partnerships.
Triggers behind the establishment of formal ecosystem-wide
agreements in the Georgia Basin-Puget Sound area have been identified
to include the growing recognition amongst decision-makers,
stakeholders, and residents on both sides of the border, that jurisdictional
lines on the map notwithstanding, they share a common airshed, common
watersheds, a common home for migratory birds and fish, and common
urban growth pressures.199 This recognition followed a number of
successful sector-specific arrangements, both formal and informal,
involving shared fish stocks and concerns with oil spills. It also drew on
earlier efforts of the federal, provincial, and state governments on both
sides of the border in advancing an ecosystem-based approach, and
hence transboundary management, in the Puget Sound-Georgia Basin
area. The spin-off effects of the formal efforts at collaboration have been
remarkable with informal non-governmental partnerships, First Nation
and tribal interests, and a host of other networks complementing the
efforts of the government and oftentimes taking the lead in securing a
more sustainable future for the area.
As noted by Hildebrand et al., these efforts have led to a crossjurisdictional sense of community among the residents of the shared
ecosystem.200 However, there are still a number of challenges to
overcome for the full potential of these collaborative efforts to be
realized. First, there is a need to ensure that transboundary partnerships
are afforded the credibility and legitimacy required to be able to access
resources and be assigned priority by responsible agencies in their
planning processes. Second, it is essential to begin to move beyond the
current level of arrangements to one in which a more comprehensive and
more fully integrated system for transboundary cooperation can take
place.
V. BI-NATIONAL POLICY OPTIONS FOR THE GULF OF MAINE
Over the past decade, there has been an increasing recognition that
effective ocean management requires an integrated approach that serves
to balance the carrying capacity of the natural system with human
demands and considers the impacts of all ocean sectors on the marine
199. Hildebrand et. al, supra note 177, at 438.
200. Id. at 441.
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environment.201 Furthermore, as described in Part III above, both Canada
and the United States have individually embraced the notion of
ecosystem-based management as a fundamental principle for addressing
coastal and ocean-related impacts in an integrated manner and for
reconciling multiple use conflicts at different geographic scales. From a
collaborative perspective, the two countries have demonstrated efforts to
adopt and implement an ecosystem-based approach in the Georgia BasinPuget Sound Initiative and in the evolving arrangements surrounding the
Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement, as described in Part IV above.
This final section of the Article discusses a suite of transboundary
policy objectives for the Gulf of Maine in general and Georges Bank in
particular. It then provides some justification as to why these should be
pursued at a bi-national level and explores a possible mechanism for
meeting these objectives through the adoption of a more holistic
approach to marine resource management for the Gulf of Maine.
A. Suite of Transboundary Policy Objectives
Having analyzed both the historical and current context surrounding
U.S.-Canada relations in the Gulf of Maine, driven in large measure by
the socioeconomic benefits provided by the shared ecosystem, we now
focus on a suite of policy objectives that encompasses both existing
interests (the fisheries) and potentially new or emerging ones (nonrenewable and renewable energy). In identifying these objectives, we
have constrained ourselves to those issues that would be regional,
ecosystemic, and tranboundary in scope. As such, policy objectives
around issues that are localized within the state or province, although
these may be extremely important and may even be common among the
respective jurisdictions, are not discussed here.202
1. Shared Objectives for the Gulf of Maine Fisheries
As has been noted repeatedly in this Article, the shared fisheries in
the Gulf of Maine have been the central focus for discussion between the
United States and Canada for decades, and, it has been argued, were a
201. See Johannesburg Summit 2002, World Summit on Sustainable Development,
Documents,
WSSD
Documents,
http://www.un.org/jsummit/html/documents/
summit_docs.html (last visited June 10. 2010); UNITED NATIONS, MILLENNIUM
DEVELOPMENT GOALS REPORT 2009, http://www.un.org/millenniumgoals/pdf/
MDG_Report_ 2009_ENG.pdf
202. Examples not discussed include coastal water quality, aquaculture, and coastal
tourism.
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principal factor behind the decision to seek a judgment from the ICJ.
Furthermore, current sectoral efforts between the two countries in
managing the shared stocks appear to lend credence to a shared policy
objective that would recognize the historical and socio-economic
significance of the fisheries to this region, while seeking to jointly
support stock rebuilding efforts. Linked to achieving these objectives is
the need to take into account cumulative impacts, protect critical habitat
for fish and other sensitive areas, and understand carrying capacity. Of
particular importance is the need to fill knowledge gaps regarding the
Georges Bank ecosystem. This important Bank still serves as a lucrative
fishing ground, despite losses to landings, income, employment, and
consumer benefits that would have been realized if the catch of
groundfish were at their long term potential level instead of being
reduced due primarily to overfishing.203 At the same time, existing
knowledge on ecosystemic connectivity across the Hague Line is being
increasingly recognized and the precautionary approach called for, so as
to influence ocean management decision-making.
2. New Economic Uses
The main transboundary policy objective regarding new economic
uses in the Gulf is the requirement to minimize negative impacts from
these activities on other users of the area as well as the environment
itself. Potential new uses include petroleum exploitation, natural gas
transshipment, renewable energy development, and ocean farming.
In the debate surrounding petroleum exploitation and the Georges
Bank moratorium, concerns were raised over the potential environmental
impacts associated with all phases of petroleum exploitation.204 During
the exploratory phase, the effects of seismic-generated noise on marine
mammals and fish behavior and mortality, at different stages of
development, were identified. During exploratory and development
drilling, the impacts arising from the release of drilling muds and
cuttings, particularly on the lucrative scallop fishery, were cause for
concern. At the production phase, the effects of produced water
containing petroleum, heavy metal, and/or naturally occurring
radioactive elements, on the commercially exploited biological resources
203. P.R. Boudreau et al., The Possible Environmental Impacts of Petroleum
Exploration Activities on the Georges Bank Ecosystem, CAN. TECH. REP. FISH. AQUAT.
SCI. 2259 (1999); Gardner Pinfold Consulting Economists Ltd, Georges Bank Resources:
An Economic Profile (1999).
204. Fanning, supra note 30.
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were raised. Also associated with the production phase was concern over
the effects of petroleum spillage, whether through blowouts, chronic
pipeline failure, or tanker accidents. While many of these concerns were
applicable to any area of the offshore, they assumed an even greater
significance when applied to the Georges Bank debate. This was due to
the additional perceived linkages between the physical and biological
processes occurring on the Bank and the belief that Georges Bank
provided seed stock for other fishing areas in the region. As such, any
disruption to these processes was seen as exacerbating the negative
consequences of any catastrophic event that might occur on the fishery.
Additional challenges to this transboundary policy objective from the
non-renewable energy sector include the issue surrounding transshipment
of liquefied natural gas in the waters of the Gulf and the threats to iconic
species and humans in the event of ship strikes and more serious
catastrophes. Of particular concern is the proposed project by Downeast
LNG Inc., to be located in Washington County, Maine. The project
would also include the transit of LNG vessels through both United States
and Canadian waters to and from the LNG terminal in Robbinston,
Maine. The intended vessel transit routes include the waters of the Gulf
of Maine, Bay of Fundy, Grand Manan Channel, Head Harbor Passage,
Friar Roads, Western Passage, and Passamaquoddy Bay.
Regarding the potential negative impacts that could arise from
emerging activities associated with the renewable energy sector in the
Gulf, there is limited specific knowledge to draw on. However, with the
proposals increasing for wind-related projects and the emerging use of
hydrokinetics as a source of renewable energy, these uses could
challenge the achievement of the shared policy objective of minimizing
impacts to existing users and the environment in the Gulf of Maine area.
Similarly, by taking a proactive approach to anticipating the
transboundary consequences of ocean farming in the Gulf of Maine,
potential areas of conflict can be minimized.
3. Co-existence
It could be argued that the drawing of the Hague Line provided the
legal basis for encouraging co-existence by Canada and the United States
in the Gulf of Maine. However, the administrative boundary holds little
relevance when addressing ecosystem-wide issues, and the need to
achieve a transboundary policy objective concerning the use of principles
of equity and fairness in the allocation of resource use and space in the
Gulf is evident. The naïve assumption that all demands on a given
ecosystem can be met ignores the inherent conflicting nature between
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many ocean activities and the underlying fact that “[w]here multiple
desirable but competing objectives exist, it is not possible to maximize
each . . . [and] in any system with multiple competing objectives, it will
not be possible to meet every one.”205
The debate between just two ocean users—the fisheries and the nonrenewable energy sector in the Gulf of Maine—has led to a decision that
favored the former use over the latter on both sides of the Hague Line.
The message conveyed by this decision was that co-existence was not
possible if the public good was to be served. However, with new and
emerging uses of the ocean environment being developed and the
impacts arising from the broader policy environment surrounding climate
change, population growth, and energy security, the influences shaping
decision-making are likely to become more complex. Given this
scenario, it is logical to explore approaches that would allow for these
transboundary policy objectives to be achieved while permitting the
effective and efficient use of shared marine resources in the Gulf of
Maine.
B. Achieving the Transboundary Policy Objectives
There are numerous factors which support our belief that these
objectives for the Gulf of Maine should be pursued in a bi-national
context, not the least of which was the explicit expectation by the Judges
of the Chamber for collaboration between these two “friendly” nations.
However, as has been noted in the case of shared fisheries management
and with regard to the ecosystem-wide activities on the Pacific coast and
the focus on water quality as an issue of concern in the Great Lakes,
these efforts have resulted in less than stellar accomplishments.
We suggest that one mechanism that could serve the needs of both
countries while addressing previous shortcomings is to develop and
implement a cooperative bi-national agreement for marine spatial
planning (MSP) for Georges Bank. This spatial area is identified rather
than the entire Gulf of Maine as a means of taking a “learning by doing”
approach to the pursuit of shared policy objectives that is ecosystemic,
rather than sector or issue specific. We submit that Georges Bank has
many of the characteristics that have been identified as benefiting from

205. Michael Weinstein et al., Managing Coastal Resources in the 21st Century, 5
FRONTIERS IN ECOLOGY & THE ENV’T 43, 44 (2007) (citing U.S. Commission on Ocean
Policy (2004)).
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the application of an MSP approach.206 These include: areas with high
levels of activity in order to balance competing activities and ensure
sustainable use of the oceans; areas where the likely increase of activity
in the region and the potential to negatively and irreversibly affect the
ecosystem (natural and human subsystems) is high; and areas in which
there is a wealth of existing knowledge (scientific and local) of the area.
Furthermore, focusing on a joint deliverable that is tractable yet adopts
current thinking in integrated oceans management, displays international
cooperative leadership on the part of both countries. It also demonstrates
to individual sectoral stakeholders that a single sector focus to decisionmaking is no longer acceptable nor capable of meaningfully addressing
the needs of any one particular sector, let alone the entire suite of
legitimate ocean users in an era of principled oceans governance.207 This
proposal also addresses a current stated priority for MSP in the United
States and, to a growing extent, Canada, and as such, is potentially
consistent with directives at the highest levels of decision-making. It is
consistent with UNLOSC articles respecting sovereign rights and powers
of coastal states while demonstrating the obligation of the duty to
cooperate in transboundary related matters. It adds scientific objective
rationale to decision-making regarding the use of the marine resources
and has the potential to be viewed as an acceptable process by all
stakeholders. Most importantly, we suggest that an acceptable champion
in the form of the Gulf of Maine Council on the Marine Environment
(GOMCME or the Council) exists to advance and successfully lead this
initiative.
C. Gulf of Maine Council on the Marine Environment
The GOMCME was established in 1989 by an agreement signed by
the Governors of Maine, Massachusetts, and New Hampshire and the
Premiers of Nova Scotia and New Brunswick to cooperatively work to
206. MSP is an iterative process involving: the identification of a geographic area
based on ecosystem objectives; the collection of baseline information on the resources
within the area; an understanding of the human activities and interactions with each other
and the environment; the identification of a science-based plan that recommends the
spatial areas for desired human activities based on current knowledge and a shared vision
for a specified temporal period; the establishment of a permitting process and conflict
resolution structures; and, a monitoring and evaluation mechanism to adjust the plan
based on new information and changing values. See McCrimmon & Fanning, supra note
133.
207. See DONALD ROTHWELL & DAVID VANDERZWAAG, TOWARDS PRINCIPLED OCEANS
GOVERNANCE: AUSTRALIAN AND CANADIAN APPROACHES (2006).
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achieve sustainable development in the Gulf region, protect natural
resources, enhance environmental quality, and maintain the ecological
balance of the Gulf.208 The establishment of the Council came about
following the recognition that, as a shared resource to the residents of the
area, there was no complementary governance structure in place to
coordinate issues of common concern at the ecosystemic level. As such,
the Gulf of Maine Council on the Marine Environment is the only
transboundary, regional-scale governance institution in the Gulf of
Maine which focuses on coordination of the marine-related activities of
state and provincial governments in the region. The Council is supported
by a Working Group of state/provincial/federal planners and resource
managers, and five committees: Data & Information Management;
Environmental Quality Monitoring; Habitat; Aquaculture; and Public
Education and Participation. Operations of the Council are assisted by a
Secretariat that rotates among the five jurisdictions on an annual basis, as
does the chairmanship of the Council.209 However, it is important to
recognize that the GOMCME serves only a coordinating function and is
not currently responsible for management decisions.
These
responsibilities rest with the agencies and departments that serve the
members of the Council.
We argue that it is precisely because of its coordinating mandate that
the Council is uniquely positioned to focus on issues that require or
benefit significantly from regional coordination.
As such a
transboundary organization, with existing mechanisms of collaboration at
the municipal, state, provincial, national, and bi-national levels, the
Council can facilitate progress towards common goals. Additionally, by
assigning the specific role of coordinating MSP development and
implementation for Georges Bank to the GOMCME, the existing
challenge of attribution for work done by the Council which currently
exists can be addressed.
It is not the intent of this Article to resolve all of the necessary
administrative, legal, and technical issues required to move forward on
our suggestion but rather to raise the issue for further consideration and
possible adoption. It is worth noting that the Council itself has been
exploring the value of pursuing more formal agreements among its
members.210 As such, answers to questions such as—what purpose
208. See
Gulf
of
Maine
Council
on
the
Marine
Environment,
http://www.gulfofmaine.org/ (last visited June 10, 2010).
209. Hildebrand et al., supra note 177, at 427.
210. On June 24-25, 2009, one of the authors led a discussion for the Council on
exploring opportunities for bi-national agreements in the Gulf of Maine.
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exactly will an agreement serve; what opportunities might come from
having such a tool implemented; when is an agreement likely to be
supported; who needs to be convinced—can be specifically focused
around a discussion of MSP on Georges Bank.
D. Challenges and Opportunities
Zoning is a term and concept typically applied to real property and
thus conjures the notion of private property interests, a notion not
comfortably acceptable to many who rightly view the ocean as public
property held in trust by the government. One challenge to marine
planning, therefore, is the notion that entities will acquire rights to use
particular segments of the ocean in a private-property-like manner, to the
discomfort of many citizens.211 An additional challenge to marine spatial
planning is its three-dimensional nature, requiring extensive data on
multiple physical, chemical, biological, and even legal parameters.212
Lastly, in the case of the Gulf of Maine, there is the real challenge
discussed at length herein that actions by one nation in a shared water
body significantly impact the resources and ecosystem of the waters of
the neighboring nation. Accordingly, planning of transboundary waters
should be undertaken in a bilateral effort, but such efforts are difficult to
coordinate and their outcomes are very hard to enforce.
The opportunities presented by involving the Gulf of Maine Council
on the Marine Environment in each nation’s developing coastal marine
spatial planning efforts are sufficiently rewarding, however, to overcome
the challenges. The GOMCME is already engaged in trans-boundary
scientific data gathering, even working to map the entirety of the Gulf of
Maine basin.213 The councilors making up the GOMCME represent
federal, state, provincial, and non-governmental organization sectors, as
well as the general public, from Nova Scotia, New Brunswick, Maine,
New Hampshire, and Massachusetts.214 They represent the authorities as
well as the individual councilors likely to be called upon to serve on
regional planning bodies in both countries. In other words, the proposed
U.S. CMSP calls for regional planning efforts to include “indigenous
community representatives with jurisdictional responsibilities or other
211. See FARA COURTNEY & JACK WIGGIN, GULF OF MAINE COUNCIL ON THE MARINE
ENVIRONMENT OCEAN ZONING FOR THE GULF OF MAINE: A BACKGROUND PAPER 6-7
(2003), available at http://www.mass.gov/czm/oceanzoningreport.pdf.
212. Id. at 7.
213. Id. at 23.
214. See Gulf of Maine Council on the Marine Environment, About the Council,
Overview, http://www.gulfofmaine.org/council/ (last visited June 10, 2010).

336

OCEAN AND COASTAL LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 15:2

interests . . . relevant to CMSP for that region.”215 The GOMCME is
ready-made for that role.
V. CONCLUSION
In the Gulf of Maine, the United States and Canada share common
concerns about fisheries resources, the impact of global climate change,
and the potential for ocean-based energy development. Although the ICJ
decision setting the boundary between the countries established territorial
rights and governance jurisdictions for fishing and energy development,
among other things, it could not shield either nation from the impacts of
the other’s activities in the Gulf. After all, the ocean is fluid and threedimensional; its ecosystems are delicate, complex and interdependent; its
resources are opaque and mobile; and its physical and chemical
properties are affected by coastal and in-shore activities from afar, as
well as ocean-based ones. Oceans do not lend themselves well to neat
boundaries and limited jurisdictional authority. As each country has
learned, moreover, managing the ocean sector-by-sector also does not
work. Accordingly, both the United States and Canada have pledged to
manage their respective ocean waters through “integrated management”
whereby multiple agencies with myriad responsibilities are obliged to
coordinate their activities toward a common, collective set of goals.
Both countries have adopted principles of sustainability, and plan to
govern using the precautionary principle, ecosystem-based management
approaches, and sound scientific data. They also intend to make public
participation the cornerstone of their ocean governance plans.
Given the common policy interests of both nations, then, it seems
logical and appropriate for the United States and Canada to actively and
progressively involve representatives from each other’s relevant agencies
when determining coastal and marine spatial planning regions and
establishing their governing bodies. It would be appropriate for the Gulf
of Maine Council on the Marine Environment in particular to be
officially engaged in the CMSP efforts for the Gulf of Maine. The
GOMCME is the only transboundary, regional-scale governance
institution in the Gulf of Maine which focuses on coordination of the
marine-related activities of state and provincial governments in the
region. Should it be tapped to engage in U.S. and Canadian CMSP with
regard to the Gulf of Maine, the GOMCME may serve as a model for
similar transnational regional bodies to govern CMSP in other boundary
215. INTERAGENCY OCEAN POLICY TASK FORCE INTERIM FRAMEWORK FOR CMSP,
supra note 157, at 12.
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waters between the United States and Canada, or even between other
nations with shared marine boundaries.

